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Tuesday, October 27, 2009 Even before we posted the final part of our short series on the natural law ( Justice, Justice, at AIP) we received enquiries asking about going into greater depth in some of the explanations. This is one of the (many ) dangers associated with trying to be brief and summarize principles and concepts that the general culture has all but abandoned or rejected. Some good examples of this are, as we have seen in previous postings, the idea of money (and, yes, we plan on completing our "brief" series on "Thoughts on Money" . . . someday ) and a sound understanding of the institution of private property. Primary among the issues raised was that of personality or personhood. There is a great deal of confusion about this relatively simple concept today. Part of the blame can be placed on the totalitarian movements that characterized the twentieth century, based on various forms of positivism that developed out of rejection of the Aristotelian/Thomist understanding of the natural moral law from the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries. We see this reflected in the separation of personhood from being — the idea that a human being is not necessarily at the same time a human person. The Nazis were adept at sowing this sort of confusion. The National Socialist Party of Germany took to the extreme the socialist tendency to redefine and eliminate natural rights whenever it became convenient or expedient to do so. Primary among the rights such totalitarians ignored or denied were, as we might expect, life and liberty (freedom of association ), as well as the capacity of individual human beings to acquire and develop virtue — the "pursuit of happiness." Largely unnoticed among the rights the Nazis redefined away from being natural was the natural right to be an owner — the right to property — and defined the exercise of property (the rights of property ) in a way that made how an owner could use what he or she owned completely dependent on the will of the State. Nor was this restricted to the Nazis. Admittedly, closet socialists, when they are Christian — especially when they are Catholic — tend to deny (especially to themselves ) that what they believe is in any way tainted with socialism, particularly since the Catholic Church has condemned socialism in no uncertain terms on many occasions. Such people forget (or ignore ) the definition of socialism given by Karl Marx in The Communist Manifesto in 1848: "The theory of the communists can be summed up in the single sentence: abolition of private property." As any Thomist or Aristotelian can tell you, redefining something changes a thing's "substantial nature," its essence, and makes the thing something other than what it was. Redefinition is thus abolition of the thing, even if you keep the same word or term for that which you have redefined; you have not changed the substantial nature of the thing that went before, but have given something else the same name, abolishing that which held the name previously. Thus, all the concerned Christians, Jews, Muslims, and other adherents of religions with social teachings based on the natural law who seek to circumvent the demands of the natural right to private property and the derived rights of private property by redefining what it means for something to be private property are (whether they realize it or not ) socialists. This is because they thereby abolish private property as what it was, and turn it into what they want it to be. This is moral and legal positivism ("modernism" in "Catholic language" ) run amok. To this we oppose the idea of personalism, the philosophy that places persons and personal relationships at the center of theory and practice in science. "Science" includes the social sciences as well as the physical sciences. Personalism regards humanity, both as individuals and as members of groups, and respect for human dignity as the focus of temporal activity, and the perfection of human beings within a just social order in a manner consistent with nature as the "end" of that activity. Personalism is an approach to Aristotelian/Thomist philosophy that emphasizes the natural rights of each human being, both individual and social, and puts human persons at the center of all human activity. The natural right to private property (correctly defined ) is an integral aspect of what it means for someone (or something ) to be a "person," and thus have a social identity. We will start to examine how private property and personhood relate to each other in the next posting in this series. | |
| Posted 2009-10-27 9:33 AM (#26497) By: gcsteven
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The belief that we're endowed by our Creator with unalienable rights is central to AIP. I was struck by the contrast provided in the very first sentence of a review paper published in the current issue of Nature: "The prime objective for every life form is to deliver its genetic material, intact and unchanged, to the next generation."
Ref: Stephen P. Jackson (U Cambridge Biochemist) & Jiri Bartek (Institute of Molecular Genetics, Prague), "The DNA-damage response in human biology and disease, Nature 461:1071, 22 October 2009 | |
| Posted 2009-10-27 10:20 AM (#26501 - in reply to #26497) By: SteveSchulin
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Wednesday, October 28, 2009 In the previous posting in this series we claimed that personality — personhood — and the natural right of private property (along with the full spectrum of other natural rights) are inextricably linked, and provide essential support for the dignity of the human person. Respect for individual natural rights is, in fact, an integral aspect of human dignity — dignitas. Further, we found that private property is not the only natural right under assault these days. Most people recognize (at least to some extent) when the natural right of free association — liberty — is being attacked, although there is a strong tendency to equivocate and downplay the implications of violations of our natural right to liberty.
Property, however, is just as important as life and liberty. This is because ownership of the means of production vests the owner both with the means to sustain life for him- or herself and his or her dependents (our posterity). Property also empowers the owner with the means to resist unjust inroads on life and liberty by other individuals, groups, or even (or especially) the State itself. Life, liberty, and property are thus essential to empowering each individual with the ability to acquire and develop virtue, thereby becoming more fully human and fitting each human being for his or her proper end.
This is, in fact, why Pope Pius XI condemned socialism. It is not because socialism seeks to abolish private property per se, but because the justification for abolishing private property results from an orientation and a philosophy that attacks and undermines the dignity of the human person. Socialism is based "on a theory of human society peculiar to itself and irreconcilable with true Christianity. Religious socialism, Christian socialism, are contradictory terms; no one can be at the same time a good Catholic and a true socialist." (Quadragesimo Anno, § 120.)
The abolition of private property is simply the most obvious and sure indication that a proposal is socialist, and constitutes an attack on essential human dignity and the natural law. You could have a socialism that permits private ownership, but does not recognize that ownership as a natural right. In moral philosophy it is the failure to recognize private ownership of the means of production as a natural right that is the basic problem, not the fact of private ownership or lack thereof — an economic problem, albeit an extremely serious one.
The rights to life, liberty, and property however, have been under continual assault since the sixteenth century, when there was a rebirth of an idea rooted in one of the very few mistakes Aristotle made, and which Aquinas went to great lengths to correct. Not coincidentally, this error experienced its renaissance at the same time that the basis of the natural law shifted from Nature (that is, Intellect or reason) to Will — that is, personal faith in something that a believer accepts as a revelation of the truth, and is, as Mortimer Adler pointed out, one of the bases for the establishment and maintenance of a totalitarian State.
Aristotle's error was to conclude that not all human beings have the same ("analogously complete") capacity to acquire and develop virtue. Thus, most people lack the full ability to conform themselves to the dictates of the natural moral law. Instead (according to Aristotle), each individual has a different capacity to acquire and develop different kinds of virtue. Some creatures, "human only in appearance," do not have any capacity to acquire and develop virtue at all. Aristotle called these human-appearing creatures, "natural slaves." Natural slaves require others to take care of them, whether the caretaker is another individual who is a full or partial human, or (as is the case with barbarian nations) the State itself.
The bottom line to Aristotle's thought — and the reason Aquinas worked so hard to correct the problem — is that, carrying this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion, some people end up being considered less human than others, while still others are thought of as not human at all. Full, even "partial" humanity becomes conditioned on something other than mere existence, that is, something other than being. If someone is strong enough to force acceptance of the case that certain individuals or even types or classes of people are not human or are not fully human, you can do anything to them that you want.
Thus, the unborn, the crippled, the mentally deficient, those who believe in the wrong religion or no religion, those with unacceptable political ideas, are social misfits, have the wrong sexual orientation, etc., etc., are thus subject to control or elimination at the will or whim of the majority, or suffer imprisonment or death.
How does this relate to the personhood of every human being? We will start to look at that in the next posting in this series.
by Michael D. Greaney
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| Posted 2009-10-28 7:04 AM (#26587 - in reply to #26497) By: gcsteven
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Thursday, October 29, 2009 1 Timothy 4:4 "For everything God created is good, and nothing is to be rejected if it is received with thanksgiving," * * *
In the previous posting in this series we looked briefly at Aristotle's error in concluding that people all have different capacities to acquire and develop virtue. We then examined some of the conclusions that necessarily follow the belief that some people are less human than others, while still others are not human at all.
Being less human (or not human) means that someone does not have the full spectrum of natural rights (or any rights at all) that necessarily accompanies the human condition. This is logical, for if you are not a full human being (that is, you do not exist completely as a human), how could you possibly be a full human person? If you are not human, of course you cannot have human rights, and are not, therefore, a person.
This is because only "persons" have rights, and only human beings can be human persons. A "person" is that which has rights, while a "thing" is the object of a right (e.g., a person owns, while a thing is owned). That which has the full spectrum of rights is a full person, while anything with less than the full spectrum is either not a full person or not a person at all.
This raises the question as to whether it is possible to be a human being, and yet not a human person. This is where a philosophy of natural law comes into play. If, as we concluded in the series on the natural law*, the law — and thus rights — is based on Nature (that is, what the human race has decided in all times and places constitutes the "good" as reflected from some absolute source), then the law is "built in" to each and every member of the human race.
Consequently, each and every human being has by his or her own nature, that is, by being itself, possession of the full spectrum of natural rights inherent in the mere fact of existence. That is, if we base the natural law on what we discern of human nature as a reflection of absolute good, the fact that someone is defined as a human being automatically means that someone is also a human person. With respect to humanity, being and personality (personhood) are inseparable. Natural rights are inalienable, including life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness.
If, however, we base the natural law on something other than what we can perceive of the absolute good * as is the case when we base the law on some religious revelation or, worse, reject the idea of natural law altogether and base human positive law on something like the "general will," then the concept of inalienable rights is abolished. Everything, as Heinrich Rommen noted in The Natural Law (51-52) becomes subject to change, clearing the way for pure moral relativism, even nihilism.
By abandoning the idea of natural law based on absolute good and discerned by reason, we open the door to such moral and legal sophistries as partial or non-personhood of that which is clearly human. Why this sort of thing is both appalling logic and bad law will be covered in the next posting in this series.
by Michael D. Greaney
Reference made by GC Stevenson: "absolute good"?
God is Good and all creation: "God did not make death, and he does not delight in the death of the living. For he has created all things that they might exist ... God created man for incorruption, and made him in the image of his own eternity, but through the devil's envy death entered the world, and those who belong to his party experience it" (Wis 1:13-14; 2:23-24). Instead they reconcile with it. Some will choose strategy over substance, mission over purpose, some will embrace the struggle, over all Justice. We should not do what is right or wrong but what we ought. Personhood or personalism is the act of Social Justice according to the churchs doctrine. Was it not Judas who tried to reconcile with political advantage the Lords keep? We are, the Holy Father John Paul II writes, “facing an enormous and dramatic clash between good and evil, death and life, the “culture of death’ and the ‘culture of Life’.” There are no nuetrals, no bystanders, no lets wait for the sun to shine on darkness, in this clash. “We find ourselves,” according to John Paul, “not only ‘faced with’ but necessarily ‘in the midst of this conflict: we are all involved and we all share in it, with the inescapable responsibility of choosing to be unconditionally pro-life, pro-personalism. For us too Moses’ invitation rings out loud and clear: ‘See, I have set before you this day life and good, death and evil. I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse; therefore, choose life, that you and your descendants may live (Deuteronomy 30:15,19). “3 1 Cf. John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae 57, 62, 65.
2 Cf. ibid., 56. Evangelium-vitae. http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae_en.html * * * from 'Person and Act', by Karol Wojtyla KAROL WOJTYLA'S VIEW OF THE HUMAN PERSON: by ANDRZEJ SZOSTEK Moral value draws its binding power from the norm of morality(71) which is man as person together with the dignity which belongs to him. The interpretation of the experience of man and morality should proceed according to an Aristotelian induction, the extension of which is, in a certain sense, a reduction. The sense of these methods which basically are one and the same lies in a unification of various elements of experience by making clear the reasons common to what appears manifold.(62) These reasons are already present in what is experienced or accessible to the mind which plays an active role in this experience. 'Natural Moral Law?' http://www.crvp.org/book/Series04/IVA-1/chapter_vii.htm
* * * Notre Dame, for warned: JOHN PAUL II: A Life for Life The locus classicus for Pope John Paul II's teaching on the culture of life and its
continual battle with the culture of death is, of course, the 1995 encyclical, Evangelium Vitae. The "headlines" in the encyclical were its decisive and irreversible rejections of the direct killing of the innocent, of abortion, and of euthanasia; in each instance
http://www.nd.edu/~ndethics/archives/documents/Weigel.pdf
* * * American Personalism;
http://www.american-philosophy.org/events/documents/Buford_Personalism.pdf
* * *
Edited by gcsteven 2009-10-29 9:33 AM
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| Posted 2009-10-29 9:29 AM (#26702 - in reply to #26587) By: gcsteven
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Monday, November 02, 2009
In Roe v. Wade (410 U.S. 113 (1973)), the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States declared that they did not know whether a fetus is a human being, but that "it" is not a person as that term is used in the Constitution. As the Wikipedia explains it (admittedly not a recognized legal authority . . . but then, neither am I), In Section IX [of the Court's opinion], the Court added that there was no legal grounds for factoring into this balancing test any right to life of the unborn fetus. The fetus would have such a right if it were defined as a legal person for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the original intent of the Constitution (up to the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868) did not include protection of the unborn. The Court emphasized that its determination of whether a fetus can enjoy constitutional protection neither meant to reference, nor intervene in, the question of when life begins: "We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer."
The logical flaw in this line of reasoning is immediately apparent to anyone with a natural law orientation. The United States is founded on the belief that "all men are created equal and are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights." As should be unnecessary to state (which means it is necessary), the term "men" includes not only adult males, but females as well as anything else defined as "human," at any stage or condition of physical, mental, or spiritual development. This is easy to understand. Whether someone is actually or potentially fully human is irrelevant. "Actuality" and "potentiality" are both stages of "being." In Aristotelian/Thomist philosophy, a thing cannot both "be" and "not be." Consequently, everything that is, is, while everything that is not, is not. This sounds confusing, but reflect on it for a moment. If something "is," it is fully what it is, without qualification. A thing cannot partially exist, or only be a part of what it is. It either exists, or it does not exist. Period. A 98-pound weakling is only potentially a Charles Atlas with the power to return sand to a bully's face and take back the girl — but the weakling (if we believe comic book ads) does have the potential to become a Charles Atlas. Both the weakling and Mr. Atlas — as well as the bully and the girl — are fully human, all having the same potential to have rippling muscles and sand-kicking capability as anyone else. Both exist as fully as the others exist. Similarly, a fetus has the potential to actualize as a fully developed human being. There is no question that a fetus is as fully human as, say, Barack Obama. "Potential" humans and "actual" humans are both human because both "are" as fully as the other. Consequently, both a fetus and Barack Obama participate in "being" as fully as does the other. Both are thus full human beings, and, within the natural law framework that provides and justifies the basis of the United States, both are therefore "persons." The argument of the American Founding Fathers was that "the present King of Great Britain" violated their natural rights to life, liberty, property, and pursuit of happiness. That is, the Founding Fathers claimed that rights ultimately come not from the State, that is, the king, but from "the laws of nature and of nature's God." According to the Founding Fathers, possession of natural rights is contingent only on mere existence. To impose any other requirement denies not only the political philosophy used to justify separation from Great Britain, but renders the American Revolution an unjustified act of rebellion. In Roe v. Wade, however, the Supreme Court effectively declared that possession of natural rights — personhood or personality — is contingent not upon mere existence of the human fetus (an obvious fact, although the majority opinion denied its implications), but on "original intent" of the framers of the 14th Amendment, as well as the "viability" of the fetus.
The 14th Amendment, however, enacted in 1868, was intended to extend the rights of citizenship to all Americans, and the protection of the law to all people. In relevant part, the Amendment states, No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
We will look at the implications of the specific wording of the 14th Amendment and the legal philosophy behind its interpretation by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade in the next posting in this series.
by Michael D. Greaney
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| Posted 2009-11-02 7:40 AM (#27007 - in reply to #26702) By: gcsteven
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Tuesday, November 03, 2009
The original intent of the framers of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States was to extend the status of "person" to human beings who had, as a necessary precondition of involuntary servitude, been denied personality or personhood. Before the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 and the 13th Amendment of the Constitution (1865), black slaves had not been construed as "persons," but as "property," that is, "things." They could thus be owned, and disposed of as their owners desired, just as the traditional rights of private property declared.
To correct this serious deficiency, over which a war had just been fought that cost the lives of an estimated 618,000 soldiers on both sides the framers of the 14th Amendment went to great lengths to try and ensure that no human being of whatever stage of physical or social development or previous condition of servitude could ever again be redefined as a "non-person" and thereby removed from the full and equal protection of the law.
The key word in the 14th Amendment is "person," just as the Supreme Court of the United States acknowledged in its opinion in Roe v. Wade. From there, however, the argument degenerates. If, as the Supreme Court argued, the original intent of the framers of the 14th Amendment omits unborn human beings from the category of "person," then equal protection of life, liberty, and property does not apply to human fetuses. This reasoning is flawed on three counts.
One (as we noted in the previous posting), the Court's reasoning makes personality — personhood — contingent upon something other than mere existence as a human being at any stage of development or condition of life. This abrogates the natural law justification for the existence of the United States as set forth in the Declaration of Independence, and undermines the authority of the Supreme Court itself.
Two, the "original intent" argument does not hold up. The framers of the 14th Amendment clearly sought to extend equal protection of the law to human beings who had previously been denied the status of person. In an astounding example of legal sophistry and mental gymnastics, the Supreme Court used the 14th Amendment in Roe v. Wade to deny the status of person to unborn human beings and restrict equal protection under the law only to those whom the Court deemed worthy of such protection.
Three, the Supreme Court claimed because the framers of the 14th Amendment did not specifically mention the fetus, and clearly did not have the fetus in mind (true — why should they?), the fetus is therefore not a person as that term is used in the Constitution. This argument ignores the 9th and 10th Amendments.
The 9th Amendment is that, "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." The 10th Amendment is that, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
Why the 9th and 10th Amendments are applicable in this case will be covered in the next posting in this series.
by Michael D. Greaney
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| Posted 2009-11-03 6:45 AM (#27093 - in reply to #27008) By: gcsteven
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Wednesday, November 4, 2009
In the previous posting in this series we noted that the 9th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is, "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." The 10th Amendment is, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
In Roe v. Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court claimed because the fetus is not mentioned in the 14th Amendment, and because the framers of the 14th Amendment clearly did not have the fetus in mind when they drafted it, the fetus is not a person as that term is used in the 14th Amendment. This is very bad Constitutional law, especially in light of the 9th and 10th Amendments, to say nothing of the Declaration of Independence, all of which must be referenced if we are to understand the 14th Amendment and its alleged applicability in taking away the natural rights of the fetus.
Of the two, by far the most relevant in interpreting the 14th Amendment is the 9th Amendment. To argue that the fetus has no rights because the 14th Amendment does not mention the fetus, or because the framers of the 14th Amendment did not have the fetus in mind when they wrote it, directly contradicts the 9th Amendment. Constitutionally and consistently, the Supreme Court would have to argue that, because of the 9th Amendment, the mere fact that the fetus is not mentioned in the 14th Amendment means that the fetus must be presumed to be a human being and thus a person until and unless it can be proved otherwise — which the Court explicitly stated they were not prepared to do. This contradicts the principle in the 9th Amendment that enumerating specific rights is not to be taken as denying any rights not so specified.
We would otherwise have to conclude that the intent of the framers of the 14th Amendment was to revoke the 9th Amendment, and make possession of all rights (and thus personhood) dependent on the will of the State. This is clearly not the case, nor did the Supreme Court attempt to make that argument. The justices simply ignored the 9th and 10th Amendments in their decision. Under the 10th Amendment, of course, it is perfectly proper for any state to prohibit abortion, because a presumed right to an abortion is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution.
Thus, the Supreme Court contradicted itself in the same decision. First, the Court argued that the fetus does not retain the natural right to life. This is because the fetus is not specifically mentioned in the 14th Amendment. This violates the 9th Amendment, because the 9th Amendment protects all rights not specifically mentioned otherwise in the Constitution. The Court then maintained that the federal government in the person of the Supreme Court can overturn any and all state laws prohibiting or limiting abortion. This violates the 10th Amendment because the power to legalize abortion is not specifically mentioned anywhere in the Constitution as being vested in the federal government. The Court thereby figured out a way to have its cake and eat it, too, by the simple expedient of doing exactly the opposite of what the Constitution allows the Court to do.
by Michael D. Greaney Topics: Natural Law, Personalism ← links Any salient points may be sent here, or comment below; http://just3rdway.blogspot.com/2009/11/personhood-and-ontology-of-personalism_04.html
"God's speed in the Personhood Imperative Movement"
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| Posted 2009-11-04 6:56 AM (#27198 - in reply to #27093) By: gcsteven
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That is EXCELLENT!
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G.K. CHESTERTON has a famous quote (well at least in my mind), regarding the decay of every high civilization, and its cause. I can’t but help think that if this higher order of consciousness, this higher order of civilization referred to as United States of America (2009) can’t but figure what a person is, than we are all doomed.
"Every high civilization decays by forgetting obvious things." -- GK CHESTERTON
Thank You Patriots who have not forgotten the obvious,… it is Liberty and Justice for all (persons).
Edited by gcsteven 2009-11-04 8:26 AM
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| Posted 2009-11-04 8:23 AM (#27206 - in reply to #27200) By: gcsteven
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Today's posting in part addresses the issue of whether rights come from
the State and are delegated to the people, or whether rights are
inherent in individuals and then granted to the State. May wish to reread Natural Moral Law: Faith and Reason*.
Thursday, November 05, 2009 In the previous posting in this series we discovered that the Supreme Court of the United States seems to have contradicted itself in the decision it rendered in Roe v. Wade. Further, the basis for the decision seems to have been in conflict with the philosophy of government espoused by the Founding Fathers of the American Republic.
The problem, of course, is obvious. The justices in Roe v. Wade took a substantially different view of the Constitution than did the framers of the Constitution, even as they cited original intent. As far as the Founding Fathers of the United States were concerned, all rights come from individual people organized as a political entity. The Constitution, consistent with the political philosophy embodied in Thomism and Roman law, is a revocable grant of rights from the people to the federal government. That is, rights are presumed to flow from the people to the State. Thus, under true "original intent," the presumption must be that the fetus has a natural right to life, which right overrides any derived or statutory right a woman — or man — might have to choose abortion.
The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade clearly took a different view of sovereignty: that rights flow from the State to the people; that the State, not people, is the ultimate sovereign. Under this orientation, people have only those rights that the State has decided to grant them. Everyone and everything becomes, ironically as expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters (268 U.S. 510 (1925)), "a mere creature of the State."
This is a complete reversal of the political philosophy on which the United States was founded, as well as a flat contradiction of essential precepts of moral philosophy. As Pope Pius XI expressed it, "Only man, the human person, and not society in any form is endowed with reason and a morally free will." (Divini Redemptoris, § 29) That is, only the human person, not human creations including any and all forms of society (even the State and the U.S. Supreme Court) has the morally free will and the correlative capacity to acquire and develop virtue — "pursue happiness" — and thus the natural rights that necessarily accompany the human condition.
Parallels between the Court's reasoning in Roe v. Wade and that of the German judiciary under the Third Reich are almost too obvious even to mention. Binding and Hoche's 1920 pamphlet, Permission to Destroy Life Unworthy of Life* (Die Freigabe der Vernichtung Lebensunwerten Lebens) comes forcibly to mind. Further, if we accept the Court's reasoning, then the 14th Amendment does not include homosexuals, Jews, communists, and a host of other possibly unpopular or socially dangerous groups in the definition of "person." After all, the framers did not mention such individuals or groups specifically in the Amendment, and clearly did not have them in mind when framing the Amendment. A strong case can be and has, in fact, been made that equal protection of the law does not extend to such mental, social, or physical defectives: "the unfit."
Even Irving Fisher, the man declared by Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman to be "America's greatest economist," published a tract in 1909 on the advisability of instituting a program of "national hygiene," including forced sterilization of defectives and other measures eventually adopted by the Nazis. ("National Vitality, Its Wastes and Conservation." Vol. 3 of the Report of the National Conservation Commission issued in 1909 as Senate document no. 676, 60th Congress, 2d Session.) Using the rationale of the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, it would be a relatively simple matter to do what the German judiciary did under the Third Reich and redefine anyone categorized as social, mental, physical, or economic undesirables as non-persons, and dispose of them.
The problem, of course, then becomes what to do about this situation. That is what we will look at in the next posting in this series.
by Michael D. Greaney
Please send any queries/notices to gcsteven@aol.com care of Michael D. Greaney, or comment on same at the http://just3rdway.blogspot.com/ blog. You can read the AIP Platform and Personal Affiliation Agreement at www.AIPNews.com.
* * * *
Permission to repost reprint "Personhood and the Ontology of Personalism", is granted to all afflicted with the AIP or AIP affiliate sites and orgs.: Any Personhood or Pro-Life org. is granted but MUST include attribution of the author(s) and the following short paragraph: Visit the following: http://www.aipnews.com/Affiliate.asp and or http://www.cesj.org/joincesj/application-mem.htm
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| Posted 2009-11-05 9:40 AM (#27332 - in reply to #27206) By: gcsteven
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“Personhood and the Ontology of Personalism”;
Great series of articles Michael, I can’t but help think what John Paul II would have said about your “Ontology of Personalism”. Perhaps he said it best in a letter to Henri de Lubac; As he had written to Henri de Lubac in 1968, Wojtyla believed that the crisis of modernity involved a “degradation, indeed … a pulverization, of the fundamental uniqueness of each human person.” Communism was one obvious, dangerous, and powerful expression of this crisis, as Nazism and fascism had been. But the dehumanization of the human world took place in other ways, and it could happen in free societies. Whenever another human being was reduced to an object for manipulation—by a manager, a shop foreman, a scientific researcher, a politician, or a lover—“the pulverization of the fundamental uniqueness of each human person” was taking place. What Wojtyla used to describe to his social ethics classes as “utilitarianism,” making “usefulness to me” the sole criterion of human relationships, was another grave threat to the human future. It was not a threat with nuclear weapons, secret police, and a Gulag archipelago, but it was dangerous, and part of the reason was that it was less obvious. Challenging whatever “pulverizes” the unique dignity of every human person is the leitmotif that runs like a bright thread through the pontificate of John Paul II and gives it singular coherence. His papacy has been a one-act drama, although different adversaries have taken center stage at different moments in the script. The dramatic tension remains the same throughout: the tension between various false humanisms that degrade the humanity they claim to defend and exalt, and the true humanism to which the biblical vision of the human person is a powerful witness. (From Witness to Hope: The Biography of Pope John Paul II, 1999) Oh! Don’t get me wrong, there are many who sense the same degradation of both the dignity of the human person and the soul to keep. Many are here in action at AIP. Thanks again, you stir in me a passion that there is hope that still burns bright in America. Yours in Justice, Guy c. PS. Perhaps if you could join us on a conference call, that light may shine brighter. We meet every Tuesday and Thursday evening at 8;00 CDT. And Saturday. The call-in number is: (218) 339-2222 and the conference ID is: 340794# PSS. Rereading your "In Defense of Human Dignity" book its excellent!
Edited by gcsteven 2009-11-05 10:18 AM
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| Posted 2009-11-05 10:03 AM (#27336 - in reply to #27332) By: gcsteven
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Monday, November 9, 2009
Some people have argued that opposition to abortion is a purely religious issue, and that therefore the State can make no laws prohibiting abortion or limiting it any way. If opposition were, in fact, purely a religious issue, that would indeed be the case — at no level, whether local, state, or federal, could any form or branch of government make any law restricting or prohibiting abortion. We are ignoring for the sake of the argument that the State does in fact have the power to make laws restricting or prohibiting religious practices if they cause harm to individuals, groups, or the common good as a whole. This was, in part, the justification for outlawing plural marriage as practiced among some branches of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints — "the Mormons."
The point, however, is that if opposition to abortion is a purely religious issue, then support for abortion cannot be a purely civil issue. As a matter of consistency and of common sense, if opposition to abortion is a religious issue, then support for abortion is also a religious issue. Any form of support for abortion by government at any level would necessarily be a violation of the 1st Amendment as it would, in effect, establish a State religion.
No, the only rational approach to the abortion issue is on the basis of civil rights. Why someone opposes or supports abortion is irrelevant, regardless whether someone is a convinced deist who thinks that God has commanded women to have abortions at will, or a devout atheist who believes that the State has no right to make politically-motivated decisions as to who and what constitutes a "person." That being the case, the issue must be handled in the public arena, with both sides accorded equal, not preferential, status and dignity.
Thus, there is currently a movement afoot in a number of states to enact "Personhood Amendments" to their respective constitutions as a prelude to amending the U.S. Constitution to correct the perceived flaws in the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. One obvious response, of course, is to point out that, given the proper understanding of the basis and form of the United States government, we don't need to amend the Constitution on this point.
This does not mean that the "Personhood Movement" is useless, wrong-headed, or anything other than a sign that "the people" are becoming sufficiently concerned about the loss of civil rights to organize in social justice and direct their efforts to the reform of the institutions of the common good. This is what Alexis de Tocqueville described as the quintessential characteristic of American life in the 1830s. According to the author of Democracy in America, people did not wait for the State to act, but took matters into their own hands as a matter of course, organized, and addressed social problems by acting directly on the relevant institutions without interference from the State. This sort of thing was so pervasive that de Tocqueville declared that in America the federal government hardly seemed to govern at all.
The mere fact of the Personhood Movement thus suggests — strongly — that there is a growing public perception that something is terribly wrong in how the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution, the second most important founding document of the United States. The most important document, of course, is the Declaration of Independence, which gives context to and justifies the Constitution. It would be a serious mistake for "the powers that be" to conclude that, because (in their opinion) "Personhood Amendments" have little chance of being enacted, the movement can safely be ignored.
If nothing else, the Personhood Movement focuses attention on the way the Supreme Court, in an exercise of what dissenting Justice Byron R. White declared an exercise of "raw judicial power," has apparently pushed some extremely creative reinterpretations onto the Constitution in furtherance of questionable political ends. The Movement alone may be sufficient, without managing to get any state or federal amendments enacted, to cause our nation's leaders to wake up to the fact that something is seriously wrong in their basic understanding of the role of the State. This, in and of itself, may be enough to persuade our leaders to take steps to correct matters.
What needs amendment and correction, then, is not the wording of the Constitution or any Amendment, but the legal philosophy and moral orientation of the justices on the Supreme Court. There is, after all, no guarantee that, in the event a Personhood Amendment is adopted, the U.S. Supreme Court will change its thinking and interpret a new amendment differently from the understanding the Court has already forced on the rather clear wording of the 14th Amendment by ignoring the 9th and 10th Amendments, leaving the situation unchanged.
Is there, however, a way to change the thinking of the Court and reorient its thinking and philosophy to something more consistent with the natural law basis on which the United States was founded?
by Michael D. Greaney
Blog link - for what others are saying.
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| Posted 2009-11-09 10:58 AM (#27753 - in reply to #27336) By: gcsteven
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Personhood and the Ontology of Personalism, Part IX
"All that is necessary for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing." Like most things that people didn't actually say, there is a germ of truth in this aphorism commonly attributed to Edmund Burke. Along with the slightly surreal observations of Yogi Berra, however (who once declared, "I never said most of the things I said"), we have to approach such oversimplifications in the right way, or we'll probably do the wrong thing. Today's posting takes a (very) brief look at three approaches to social action, or lack thereof to restore recognition of human personality in the social order: 1) State action to force people into some predetermined mold that usually manages to have results other than what was intended, 2) individual action that ends up being completely ineffectual, and 3) acts of social justice, as described in Introduction to Social Justice* by Rev. William Ferree. Tuesday, November 10, 2009 In the previous posting in this series we discovered that the current push for "Personhood Amendments*" in a number of states is a necessary and salutary effort in the struggle to restore the social order to something more conformable to the principles of the natural law, and thus to human nature. The problem is that there are groups that seem determined to remake humanity in their own image, and force their vision onto everyone else, using the coercive power of the State to accomplish this end.
Part of the problem with reorienting people's thinking is the fixed idea many people have that the State can do anything, or (more accurately) that we can use the State to gain whatever ends we desire, and that the individual is helpless in the face of unjust social structures. This is an extremely naïve view not only of the role of the State and of the place of the person in the State, but also of the power that the State and the law actually have to change attitudes and behavior, that which constitutional scholar Albert Venn Dicey*, noted for his emphasis on the "rule of law," (1835-1922) called "public opinion."
As Dicey pointed out in his landmark study on the sociology of law, the less-than-snappily-titled if extremely erudite and profound (and out of print, except for what reviewers have called an overpriced and very bad edition) Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth Century (1905), the effectiveness of any law depends on how the public receives it. That is, how "public opinion" agrees with and perceives a particular law affects the understanding and interpretation of that law and other institutions, as well as its enforcement.
Dicey's book, by the way, is an excellent accompaniment to Alexis de Tocqueville's sociological analysis, Democracy in America (Volume I*, 1835; Volume II*, 1840). Not surprisingly, both de Tocqueville and Dicey were great admirers of the United States. Both, however, pinpointed possible dangers in the American system that have, in large measure, made serious inroads on the natural rights of life, liberty, property, and pursuit of happiness, the protection of which presumably constitutes the chief reason and justification for the United States. For de Tocqueville, the danger lay in false notions of equality, while for Dicey the concern was the corruption he saw inherent in party politics.
Dicey's conclusion was that if people are prepared to accept a new law, there is a high likelihood that the law will be obeyed and have the intended result. If, however, people are not prepared to accept a new law, then there is a high likelihood that the law will not be obeyed, or will have effects sometimes the exact opposite of what was intended. The best examples of the latter case in the United States are the Fugitive Slave Act* of 1850 and Prohibition*, both of which were widely disobeyed and actually advanced the activities they were intended to counter.
In social justice, of course, the primary power to change and reform our institutions rests not with the State, but with individual people. This, however, can be misunderstood as a statement of individualism or anarchy. On the contrary, as Rev. William J. Ferree, S.M., Ph.D., makes clear in Introduction to Social Justice, ordinary, everyday people have the power to act directly on the common good. The common good is the network of institutions within which we as human persons exercise our natural rights and thereby acquire and develop virtue.
It is not, however, as individuals per se that we have the power to act directly on the institutions of the common good, including our laws, customs, and traditions, but as members of organized groups — who remain, at the same time, fully differentiated individuals within the organized structure of an institution. As Edmund Burke declared in Thoughts on the Cause of Present Discontents (1770): "When bad men combine, the good must associate; else they will fall one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in a contemptible struggle." (Burke did not say, "All that is necessary for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing," an individualistic rephrasing of the more socially-just approach Burke described.)
This, the apparent paradox of social justice, explains how we can retain our individual identity and human dignity, and at the same time, act in accordance with our political nature — as Aristotle reminds us, "man is by nature a political animal." That still leaves us, however, with the problem of protecting each person's essential human dignity in the face of such egregious misunderstanding and misinterpretation of basic principles of the natural moral law and the United States Constitution as exemplified by Roe v. Wade.
If, as we have seen, public opinion appears to be ranged against any limitations on the presumed right to an abortion (as if any right could ever be exercised without any kind of limitation on its exercise), how do we, as seemingly helpless individuals, organize and change public opinion so that public opinion no longer regards abortion as a right, and that a law making abortion illegal — if it would even be necessary at that point — would be effective instead of destructive of the social order?
In the next posting in this series we will begin to examine one possibility that appears to have the potential to satisfy all competing claims in this issue, at least those that base (or attempt to base) their positions on reason and rule of law.
by Michael D. Greaney
until then,..."God Love ya!"
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| Posted 2009-11-10 7:43 AM (#27826 - in reply to #27753) By: gcsteven
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The question for an Imperative*; Can an unjust law command our obedience? The answer is "yes" — and "no,"
depending on the circumstances. Combining this with the problem that
even a just law will not be obeyed or can result in the opposite of what
was intended if not supported by what A. V. Dicey called "public
opinion," and we end up with a very complex issue indeed. Today's
posting takes a very brief look at the circumstances under which we may
— or must — disobey an unjust law, and when we must obey it.
Wednesday, November 11, 2009
As a practical matter, and leaving out ethical considerations, if abortion were to be outlawed tomorrow, it is highly likely that the law would be flouted to an even greater extent than the Fugitive Slave Act or Prohibition. Going contrary to what many people, rightly or wrongly, have become convinced is a right is a recipe for social disaster on a massive scale. This is why Aquinas counsels that obedience even to the worst of laws is required, if breaking the law or refusing to obey it would cause the situation to get worse, cause massive social upheaval, or even the destruction of the social order itself.
In De Regimine Principum, the "Angelic Doctor" (as Aquinas is sometimes called), relates the story of the tyrant Dionysus of Syracuse who, at a time when he seemed to be reviled and hated by everyone, was surprised to come across an old woman praying fervently to the gods for his safety and long life. Naturally enough, Dionysus asked why, when everyone else was hoping for his early demise, she was doing exactly the opposite. The old woman explained that when she was a young girl, a terrible tyrant oppressed the land, and everyone prayed for deliverance. The tyrant died, and was replaced with a worse one, and so on, until now, near the end of her life, Dionysus, the worst of the lot, seized power. That being her experience, she now prayed that he would last long in power, for she couldn't take anyone worse.
In moral philosophy (ethics), the only time we are permitted to disobey even a bad law is when the law requires us, individually and personally, to act contrary to our consciences. Coerced obedience in that case would constitute an offense against our human dignity. This is the same human dignity that the State, as guardian of the common good, is required to safeguard by preserving and protecting the institutional environment within which we as moral creatures acquire and develop virtue and so become more fully human.
Pro-Choice advocates, whether or not they realize this principle on a conscious level, have been quick to exploit it to the disadvantage of the Pro-Life movement. Pro-Choice advocates are in the forefront of those who demand obedience to the law . . . as long as it is a law with which they agree. Logically, of course, consistent with their line of reasoning that Roe v. Wade established abortion on demand as the law of the land, simply passing a law to the contrary would end the matter. If they acted in a manner consistent with their expressed principle that the State in the person of the United States Supreme Court creates the law and thereby determines what is right and wrong, Pro-Choice advocates would defend the outlawing of abortion with the same vigor, even fanaticism with which they have defended the presumed right to abortion, similarly (presumably) established by law.
Simply passing a law, as we have seen, however, does nothing if people are not prepared to accept or obey the law. In the event a law prohibiting abortion on demand, were to be passed, many people would act contrary to their stated principles, and disobey it, despite their previous insistence that the law as established by the State is absolute and sacred. To believe otherwise is to be living in a fantasy world.
There is, however, a very effective tactic that has yet to be tried; one that is based not on passing a new law, but on demanding full and impartial enforcement of what Pro-Choice advocates insist is the current law of the land. In one sense, of course, this could be viewed as a very clever turning of the tables on the Pro-Choice position. Ultimately, however, it is not some kind of legal chicanery, but a simple demand for justice — and on the terms set and the ground defined by the Pro-Choice movement. That is what we will cover in the next posting in this series.
by Michael D. Greaney
*Hence, is Justice an Imperative? ,... establish Justice. Isn't that in the U.S. Constitution? ,......... and How ?
...until then "God Love You!" | |
| Posted 2009-11-11 8:56 AM (#27953 - in reply to #27826) By: gcsteven
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"Everyone has the right to be stupid, but some people abuse the privilege." While not uncommon, and with a certain cleverness and wit, that riposte (attributed to the ever-popular "Anonymous") displays an inherent misunderstanding about rights and duties. Today's posting starts to examine of just what a "right" consists, and why the insistence on a presumed right to choose could be the Pro-Choice movement's greatest weakness. Thursday, November 12, 2009
As we noted in the previous posting in this series, simply passing a law to prohibit abortion or adopting a Constitutional amendment protecting personality (which already exists in the 14th Amendment) would in all likelihood be ineffective. If what A. V. Dicey called "public opinion" does not support the law, the law will either not be obeyed, or will have a substantially different effect than what was intended. For any legislation affecting abortion to be effective, there must be some sort of common ground on which Pro-Choice and Pro-Life adherents can meet and agree.
Some people have complained that using the term "Pro-Choice" is both misleading and concedes too much to the opposition. That may be the case, but (as we shall see presently) it is a meaningless concession that has the potential to provide the basis for a quantum advance for the Pro-Life movement — if Pro-Choice advocates are sincere in their beliefs, especially the existence of a right to free choice, and honest (or at least consistent) in their application of the principle.
First, we have to realize of what a right consists. A right is the power to do or not do some act in relation to others. The existence of a right (which implies the functioning of justice) necessarily involves a correlative duty. A duty is the obligation to do or not do some act in relation to the right holder. Thus a right to a free choice regarding a specific act means that someone has the power to choose to do or not do that act, with the choice being free from coercion or undue influence exercised by others.
The right of a free choice regarding a specific act necessarily includes the right of a free choice to participate materially or not participate materially in assisting others in doing or not doing that act. For example, if slavery were legal, someone could freely choose to own a slave. The prospective slave owner could not, however, by any means force someone who does not choose to own a slave either to own a slave, to assist the prospective slave owner in any material way in procuring a slave, or to promote slavery or slave owning.
The State has a monopoly over the instruments of coercion to force compliance with its will. This, of course, must be in accordance with the general consent of the governed, as long as the general consent of the governed or the interpretation and application of that will does not violate either a natural right held by everyone (regardless of their expressed will) or the rights of a minority.
Given the legality of slavery, the State's obligation would therefore be limited to permitting people to own slaves, and to passing and enforcing laws regulating the sale, purchase, and possession of slaves (e.g., acceptable treatment, working conditions, compensation, etc.). The State would be exceeding its authority if it were to force non-slave owners or abolitionists to own slaves, promote slavery, or to subsidize slavery through the tax system — all actions that involve either active or implied coercion on the part of the State, and thus an exercise of undue influence or actual threat forcing people to act contrary to their consciences.
We can make the same observations regarding the wage system prevalent under both capitalism and socialism. Given the existence of the wage system, an arrangement that some people have described as a condition of "wage slavery," the State's obligation is limited to permitting people to subsist exclusively on wages, and to passing and enforcing laws regulating hiring, termination, and terms of employment (e.g., acceptable treatment, working conditions, compensation, etc.). The State exceeds its authority if it forces people to work solely for wages, promotes the wage system over other economic arrangements, subsidizes the wage system, or prohibits or inhibits ownership of the means of production by anyone — thereby establishing a condition of society that Hilaire Belloc* called "the Servile State" in his 1912 book of the same title.
How these principles relate to the Pro-Choice debate will be covered in the next posting in this series.
by Michael D. Greaney
Michael, this is my favorite;
"Everyone has the right to be stupid, but some people abuse the privilege, and make a virtue out of it.”
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| Posted 2009-11-13 8:32 AM (#28159 - in reply to #27953) By: gcsteven
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As has become increasingly obvious over the last couple of centuries,
the individual as an individual is frequently helpless to address social
problems. The temptation is then to give up and accept existing
conditions and situations as a given or opt out of society, or to
surrender all sovereignty to the State in the hope that our rulers will
straighten things out somehow. As is equally obvious from the history
of the 20th century, neither course is effective. Today's posting
explores the possibility of something between the two extremes of pure
individualism and collectivism: the act of social justice.
Monday, November 16, 2009 As we have seen in the previous postings in this series, the Pro-Choice position seems to have the Pro-Life position completely boxed in. In substantiation, we have the clear teaching in moral philosophy that if a bad law, even a very bad law, does not force us personally to do evil, we must permit the law to continue, if our taking action would reasonably be expected to disrupt significantly or destroy the social order. Social order — the network of institutions known as the common good — is such a great good that we must allow even incredible evil to continue if stopping the evil would destroy or materially harm the social order. To put an end to the matter, we are constantly told that abortion on demand is the law of the land. It must be permitted and supported without question with all the resources of the State and the people.
Regardless of the shoddy legal and social reasoning behind such assertions, the Pro-Life movement, and (evidently) the Personhood Movement to some degree appear to have accepted this understanding of the situation. Consequently (so the reasoning seems to go), if the law can be changed, then the coercive power of the State and all the resources of the nation can be used to stop abortion rather than protect and promote it. This understanding ignores both political and social reality, and the act of social justice.
As we previously noted in this series, simply passing a law — whether in the form of an Amendment to the Constitution or a Supreme Court decision — does nothing to change a situation if people don't want it to be changed. Prohibition, for example, while intended to eliminate the presumed scourge of drunkenness and all the crime and sin associated with the consumption of alcohol, caused massive upheaval in the social order. Public opinion was opposed to Prohibition to such an extent that conventional government and rule of law virtually disappeared in some areas of the country.
The Supreme Court's decision in Scott v. Sandford (60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)) that upheld the right to own slaves everywhere in the United States and overturned the Missouri Compromise of 1820 was itself effectively overturned within five years by the bloodiest war in American history. The Supreme Court's role in exacerbating the conflict between Pro-Slavery adherents and Abolitionists in the Dred Scott decision, combined with the presumed economic necessity of chattel slavery argued in David Christy's 1855 Cotton is King, has not been adequately studied or appreciated as a direct cause of the Civil War.
The situation seems hopeless — which is precisely what it is . . . at least from the standpoint of individual and individualistic efforts to solve the problem. To illustrate this, let's paraphrase a passage from Rev. William Ferree's, Introduction to Social Justice (44-45), substituting "abortion" for "honesty." The question is: What can Jane Jones do as an individual? She might, for instance, decide to give the community "a good example" of a Pro-Life approach to the problem. That is, she could refuse to obtain an abortion, regardless of the circumstances surrounding her situation (e.g., rape, incest, lack of adequate or secure income, social embarrassment, etc.), and allow herself to be showcased as an exemplar of adherence to Pro-Life principles. This sounds good; but, remembering that what is wrong with that community is that everyone considers it normal to have an abortion under these and similar circumstances, we might readily calculate the chances that Jane Jones' heroic adherence to Pro-Life principles would have of reforming the community. When she refuses to go along with the dictates of public opinion, she will be idolized briefly by a relatively small segment of the population, vilified and ridiculed in the media, and shunned by family and friends for making the wrong choice. As soon as the next cause célèbre comes along, she will be forgotten, having lost in the interim her job, her reputation, and virtually all hope of a normal life in society. It is unlikely that her example will attract many followers among women seeking abortions or men promoting them. Her mistake was to attack a social evil with only individual means.
The question becomes what to do about this situation. We will start to look at that in the next posting in this series.
by Michael D. Greaney
Reflection for today: Matthew 18:20 “For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." Is there a verb in there somewhere, an action? [Proper and improper] | |
| Posted 2009-11-18 9:36 AM (#28548 - in reply to #28159) By: gcsteven
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As Pope Pius XI pointed out in § 53 of Divini Redemptoris ("On Atheistic Communism"), 1937, "It happens all too frequently, however, under the salary system, that individual employers are helpless to ensure justice unless, with a view to its practice, they organize institutions the object of which is to prevent competition incompatible with fair treatment for the workers."
As Father Ferree comments in Introduction to Social Justice (1948), not one in 100 people will grasp the fact that the pope was not talking about trying to impose justice directly, — that is, attack a social evil with individual means by mandating an ever-increasing fixed wage level — but about organizing as members of groups coming together in solidarity to work directly on our institutions (social justice) so that, indirectly by our acts, fair treatment once again becomes possible, though not coerced (individual justice), except in cases of actual injustice. The end of social justice is not specific individual results, however good they might be (e.g., a just wage), but a system, a network of institutions, within which desired individual results can be reached; an equality of opportunity, not an equality of results.
Today's posting looks at this principle as it might apply to the "Personhood Movement":
Tuesday, November 17, 2009 In the previous posting in this series we noted that, according to Rev. William Ferree, eulogized on his death in 1985 as "America's greatest social philosopher," even super-heroic individual virtue has little if any chance of ameliorating a social evil. As the paraphrase of the passage from Introduction to Social Justice pointed out, "Her [Jane Jones'] mistake was to attack a social evil with only individual means." The question becomes, "How should she have gone about it?"
The Personhood Movement and the Pro-Life movement could, of course, continue to do exactly what they are doing: stage public demonstrations and distribute propaganda (in the good sense) with the end of enacting a law or adopting a constitutional amendment the object of which is to prevent abortion. We have seen, however, that simply passing a law or even amending the Constitution is, absent public support, ineffectual and can even bring about greater evils than the one presumably being eliminated.
The ineffectiveness of the usual approach (aside from its implicit denial of individual sovereignty within the social order and its reliance on the coercive power of the State to impose desired ends) is evident once we internalize the basic principles of social justice. Primarily, as Father Ferree points out in his unfinished ms., Forty Years After . . . A Second Call to Battle (c. 1985), such demonstrations, necessary and useful as they might be to raise public consciousness of an issue and even in saving infants' and mothers' lives on an individual basis, all have one fatal weakness: they are all inevitably demands that somebody else do something, i.e., stop having, performing, supporting, or promoting abortions. The demonstrator is, socially speaking, completely ineffectual, although left with a feeling of great virtue and vast superiority over other, less enlightened people who "don't get it." The institution of abortion as a socially acceptable thing is left unchanged, except perhaps to strengthen the resolve of Pro-Choice adherents to resist the efforts of the "antis" to take away their right to choose.
We find the answer to this seemingly insoluble situation in the laws and characteristics of social justice. As Father Ferree explains in Introduction to Social Justice (52),
Another corollary of this characteristic of Social Justice (that it is never finished) is that it embraces a rigid obligation. In the past when it was not seen very clearly how the duty of reform would fall upon the individual conscience, the idea became widespread that reform was a kind of special vocation, like that to the priesthood, or the religious life. It was all very good for those people who liked that sort of thing, but if one did not like that sort of thing, he left it alone.
All that is changed! Since we know that everyone, even the weakest and youngest of human beings, can work directly on the Common Good at the level where he lives, and since each one "has the duty" to reorganize his own natural medium of life whenever it makes the practice of individual virtue difficult or impossible, then every single person must face the direct and strict obligation of reorganizing his life and the life around him, so that the individual perfection both of himself and of his immediate neighbors will become possible. This idea should not be taken alone, it should be held only in conjunction with the characteristics we have already seen, namely, that one cannot practice Social Justice alone as an individual, but only with others; and that the realization of Social Justice takes time.
That is, when individual virtue cannot function, nor does so partially or inadequately, the solution is to organize with others, and work directly not on the specific problem itself, but on the surrounding institutions of the common good that are "allowing" the problem to continue or, in extreme cases, causing the problem.
With respect to abortion and the effort to get the fetus recognized as a person in conformity with the principles of the natural moral law on which the United States was founded, this is a two-step process, which we will begin examining in the next posting in this series.
by Michael D. Greaney
Personhood Imperative. ← link
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| Posted 2009-11-18 9:41 AM (#28550 - in reply to #28548) By: gcsteven
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Personhood and the Ontology of Personalism, Part XIV
Today's posting addresses the issue of a truly Pro-Choice position that
is consistent in its principles and in its application of those
principles. Previous postings have detailed precepts of the natural
moral law and how they can be applied in order to find a genuine common
ground on which both sides can meet and reach an accommodation, given
the current condition of society. Today we look at what specific
actions might be taken should either side reject the principles of the
natural moral law.
Wednesday, November 18, 2009 In the previous posting in this series we noted that individual or individualistic approaches to fundamental social change are, absent some miracle, usually ineffectual. That is because individual methods are generally useless in addressing a social situation. We are, however, left with a serious problem. It is contrary to the principles of natural law on which this country is explicitly based to force anyone to participate in an act that person regards as evil. Forcing citizens to participate in a morally repugnant act is, in moral philosophy, legitimate grounds for changing rulers, even (in extreme cases) the form of government. (Aquinas, De Regimine Principum, I.vi; Bellarmine, De Rom. Pont. Eccl. Monarchia, Lib. I, Cap. VI. Nota quarta. De Laicis, Cap. VI; also Recognitio, Libri Tertii De Laicis.)
Nevertheless, we have to acknowledge that, in the present state of society, unilaterally abolishing legalized abortion is not practicable, even if it could be done tomorrow. Such a move would, in all likelihood, cause even more immediate harm to the social order than that inflicted at present by abortion and other activities that the Pro-Life movement considers related. As Rev. William Ferree points out in Introduction to Social Justice, the primary law of social justice is that the common good must be kept inviolate. (35) As "America's greatest social philosopher" explains, To attack or to endanger the Common Good in order attain some private end, no matter how good or how necessary this latter may be in its own order, is social injustice and is wrong. The Common Good is not a means for any particular interests; it is not a bargaining point in any private quarrel whatsoever; it is not a pressure that one may legitimately exercise to obtain any private ends. It is a good so great that very frequently private rights — even inviolable private rights — cannot be exercised until it is safeguarded. (Ibid.)
This is not to say that continued legalized abortion will not inflict even greater harm on the common good in the long term. It is a case of dealing with the lesser — that is, the most immediate — of two evils (maintaining order in society in the face of obvious, even horrifying injustice), not an admission that abortion is somehow a good. Direct participation in abortion is always evil, but at present the anticipated evil of the serious disruption or destruction of the social order should abortion be outlawed is of more immediate concern.
There is, however, a possible "common ground" that can exist in the debate, and gives us a basis for achieving the only possible compromise between the Pro-Life and the Pro-Choice positions: the Pro-Life economic agenda. If abortion supporters are truly "Pro-Choice," then they should be the strongest supporters of a Pro-Life economic agenda designed to remove entirely any economic incentive to procure an abortion, thereby bringing an end to the undue influence on free choice exerted by economic institutions.
Consistent with that, Pro-Choice advocates should also be in the forefront in the effort to remove all government financial support for abortions, direct or indirect, thereby taking away the implied political and social endorsement for abortion, the effects of which can obviate "free" choice even more effectively than economic forces. A fully consistent Pro-Choice position would be to deny any and all deductions for taxpayers who give money to support or procure abortions. This is because tax deductibility involves a substantial degree of government support, as well as providing what amounts to a subsidy that must be made up by increasing taxes paid by all taxpayers.
In view of the political realities of the situation, the Pro-Life movement may be able to give a reassurance to the Pro-Choice movement that, consistent with the democratic process, abortion will not be criminalized until such time as an overwhelming consensus is reached that this should, indeed, be the case. This is, to all intents and purposes, a meaningless concession. Such a law would be ineffective anyway until and unless an overwhelming consensus is reached, something of which the Pro-Choice movement should be fully aware.
Still, should the Pro-Choice movement balk at eliminating all forms of government support (financial and otherwise) for abortion, the Pro-Life movement must seek legal redress. As we have seen, it is both inconsistent and unconstitutional for the Pro-Choice movement to demand the right to choose whether or not to have an abortion, or support or promote abortion, and yet at the same time deny others the right to choose whether or not to pay for that abortion through the use of their tax monies. A challenge to federal, state and local government support in any form for abortions should, on legal grounds, have a good chance of becoming law — to say nothing of saving massive amounts of money that, in these times of economic turmoil, could certainly be put to better use.
Failing that, an option that might be considered is a "tax revolt," although such action cannot be recommended except as a last resort against a State that has, in effect, become a tyranny. Although the position was equivocal (being based on private judgment about the morality of the action), during the Vietnam War, a number of people either refused to pay taxes at all, or withheld a portion of their taxes. Many of them ended up in prison, but if the 51% of the population that, according to a recent Gallup Poll describe themselves as "Pro-Life" refused to pay unjust taxes, the government would be forced to capitulate. Such a move, of course, would be feasible only after all legal means were exhausted, including bringing the case to the Supreme Court, which, if it wishes to retain its credibility, could not rationally allow free choice to obtain an abortion while denying free choice to pay for it.
Removal of all forms of government support at all levels for abortion in any way shape or form is only a part of the solution, although it would constitute in and of itself a major victory. Such an effort should, in the interests of equal rights for all, be led by the American Civil Liberties Union. The ACLU would otherwise have to admit publicly that the rights they demand for their preferred groups and causes do not, in fact, apply equally to all.
Further, removing all forms of government support at all levels would convince a great many people, trained to look to the State as the arbiter of right and wrong, that abortion might not be quite as fundamental a right as Pro-Choice adherents insist, and go a long way toward persuading people that all human beings, including fetuses (Latin for "unborn human being") are persons within the natural law context of the United States Constitution, and the Declaration of Independence which (while not itself law) gives context to the Constitution.
Two more things are necessary, both of which we will cover in the next and final posting in this series.
by Michael D. Greaney
Reflections for today: Matthew 22: (19-22)
“Show me the coin that pays the census tax." Then they handed him the Roman coin. He said to them, "Whose image is this and whose inscription?" They replied, "Caesar's." At that he said to them, "Then repay to Caesar what belongs to Caesar and to God what belongs to God." When they heard this they were amazed, and leaving him they went away. * * * Genesis 1: 26-27
Then God said: "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. Let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, the birds of the air, and the cattle, and over all the wild animals and all the creatures that crawl on the ground."
God created man in his image; in the divine image he created him; male and female he created them.
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| Posted 2009-11-18 9:44 AM (#28551 - in reply to #28550) By: gcsteven
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Thus,.. by insisting that abortion is a right under free choice, the Pro-Choice movement has boxed itself in. They cannot claim a right to choose and deny it to others. This is the common ground on which the two sides can meet. The Pro-Choice movement is in a legally untenable position, and the Pro-Life movement can offer them a way out — which just happens to be in the direction that the Pro-Life movement wants things to go, i.e., bringing a halt to all government support in any form at all levels of government for abortion.
Thursday, November 19, 2009 As we saw in the previous posting, the belief that abortion is a constitutionally-protected right is both the Pro-Choice movement's greatest strength and, paradoxically, its greatest weakness. No one can claim a right to choose to have, materially assist in procuring, or support abortion without at the same time acknowledging the right of others to choose not to have, materially assist in procuring, or support abortion.
If some people are denied the right to choose in order to secure the right of choice of others, then the presumed right to choose abortion is not, strictly speaking, a true right, but (just as Justice Bryan White declared) an exercise of raw judicial power — an act of tyranny by means of which one group forces its will on another group or groups. The Pro-Life movement can therefore justly demand that all forms of government support for abortion cease immediately — or force the Pro-Choice movement to admit that the alleged choice they themselves are demanding applies only to them, and is not, in fact, a right at all (which implies the functioning of justice), but the creation of a privileged class or establishment of a State religion that has been granted the power to rob the taxpayer for its own benefit.
Still, useful and effective as removal of all federal, state, and local government support for abortion would be, it is clearly not enough. Abortions took place long before anyone had the idea that there was any kind of right involved, or even before there was any kind of State subsidy or support. Once all government support for abortion has been eliminated, then, two things remain to be done.
First, people must be educated to realize that the fetus is a human being, is thus a person, and thereby entitled to the full spectrum of natural rights that necessarily accompany the human condition. The Pro-Life movement has been perfecting its techniques in this effort since 1973, and, considering the massive amounts of money spent by the Pro-Choice movement and the government support it enjoys, has been astonishingly successful. Nothing should be done to decrease current efforts. A good case can and should be made that efforts must, on the contrary, increase dramatically. No day should pass without continuous protests outside any and all facilities providing abortions; no magazine or newspaper should be without its educational Pro-Life advertisement or article; prime time radio and television, as well as the internet, should carry a full load of both informational and educational advertising. Denial of media access should be the basis for a lawsuit on the grounds of denial of free speech.
People in the Pro-Life movement might want to consider refusing to take even legitimate tax deductions for contributions for Pro-Life purposes. While any legal justification for denying tax deductibility is shaky — many Pro-Choice advocates claim to support the aims of the Pro-Life movement other than an end to abortion, and it is highly questionable whether even the United States Supreme Court would move to so abridge or discourage freedom of speech — such a move would be another great moral victory at a relatively small cost. Most people who contribute to Pro-Life organizations or causes do not consider the tax effects in any event, and voluntarily surrendering a legitimate tax deduction removes the possibility that the Pro-Life movement would be labeled hypocritical for demanding an end to tax deductions for contributions to Pro-Choice organizations or causes, while continuing to take advantage of them to present an opposing view.
There is, however, one remaining thing that must be done. The charge of hypocrisy has already been leveled at the Pro-Life movement, chiefly on the grounds that people in the movement care only what happens to the fetus, not about the quality of life of the baby once born. This, up to a point, is a legitimate criticism, but hardly of the magnitude to be termed hypocritical.
The adoption of a Pro-Life economic agenda, first for the United States, and then the world would not only remove the charge of hypocrisy from the Pro-Life movement, it would in large measure remove any and all economic justification for abortion. One program that should be investigated that may have the potential to open up the opportunity for each family to generate (their OWN) income sufficient to meet common domestic needs adequately is Capital Homesteading for every citizen, from the book with the same title.
Capital Homesteading has been described many times on this blog, and a large amount of material is available on the website of the Center for Economic and Social Justice (CESJ), including a free download of the book, Capital Homesteading for Every Citizen, which is also available in paperback from Amazon and Barnes and Noble. Some of the philosophical orientation of the Just Third Way can be found in, In Defense of Human Dignity, also available in paperback from Amazon and Barnes and Noble. (Anglophiles and UK residents can also find both books on Amazon UK: Capital Homesteading for Every Citizen, In Defense of Human Dignity.) Anyone wanting to help promote these ideas might want to consider writing a review of (and giving a high rating to) either of these books.
Anyone interested in promoting a Pro-Life economic agenda — and, incidentally, a possible way out of the current Great Recession (a.k.a., "The Jobless Recovery") — should look over the material on the CESJ website, and consider in what way he or she could advance the effort. One of the better ways is to spread the word, and open doors to "prime movers" such as Barack Obama who might be open to hearing about something that has the promise to deliver justice instead of inflation, joblessness, war, poverty, and death.
by Michael D. Greaney
[Personhood Imperative; Proclamation and Pledge- Article 6&7]
“The undersigned citizens hereby call upon each and every elected or appointed official or officer of the United States, and of any of the States, to henceforth give no assistance of any kind to those who enable or effectuate abortion or euthanasia, and that they adhere faithfully to their sworn oath of office, made before God, to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States, whose central principle is the preservation and protection of innocent human life.
“We hereby solemnly pledge to our fellow citizens as a sacred obligation to withhold, from this day forward, any and all political or financial support from any candidate for public office, at any level of governance, who fails or refuses to adhere to the explicit provisions of this Proclamation. We also hereby pledge to withhold, from this day forward, support of any kind for the continued employment in government of any person or officer of the United States who fails in their sworn duty to protect innocent human life from its bodily genesis.
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| Posted 2009-11-19 10:52 AM (#28664 - in reply to #28551) By: gcsteven
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